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,Runnymede or Marbury4 or Yick Wo v. Hopkins.5 The Harvard philos-opher Josiah - Royce saw the whole of ethics and civilization and law
rooted in the ideal of "loyalty to loyalty." "Loyalty to loyalty to law"
best epitomizes Dean Pound's vision of our inheritance and our future.
Grateful readers of these lectures accordingly can hope for another series
on the problems inherent in contemporary due process and equal protection-themes brilliantly discussed in recent articles by Judge Hastie'
and Professor Kadish.7 The lessons and the way ahead again are fit
subjects for the Dean of American jurisprudence.
HOWARD -JAY GRAHAMt

By Albert P. Blaustem and ClarDESEGREGATION AND THE LAW.
ence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 327. $5.00.
After four years the decision of the Supreme Court in the school
segregation cases' is still defied in large areas of the country. This
defiance by people who regard themselves as law-abiding is necessarily
coupled with a deep feeling that the Court's decision lacks legal justifica.tion: that the Constitution itself does not bar racial segregation and that
.the.'Supreme Court stepped outside its competence as interpreter of thie
-Constitution to impose upon the South the personal preferences of the
-justices.
The authors of Desegregationand the Law have devoted their book
to this critical impasse. They seem to have realized that the situation
calls not only for accurate information but also for a calm and temperate
attitude which alone can permit a reasoned approach to the problem.
The authors bring both, in generous measure, to the book. Their stated
goal is not to debate the constitutional issues but rather to explain the
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
stil within the prohibition of the Constitution." Id. at 373.
6. Hastie, Judicial Method in Due Process Inquiry, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW
326 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
7. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
' Bibliographer, Los Angeles County Law Library; Guggenheim Fellow, 1958.
1. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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legal and historical process which produced the decision and to describe
the legal situation which now confronts the country. The authors try
manfully-although of course without complete success-to put to one
side their own judgments about the decision. The result is a book which
in some respects will not satisfy the extremists in either camp but which
can be read by both without apoplexy and with enlightenment.
The authors are sensitive to the fact that polemics over the case
tear the decision from its historical and legal context. About a third of
the book is therefore devoted to filling in the background; the role of
precedent in the course of constitutional development, the development
(from Dred Scott) of legal views about the rights of Negroes, and the
setting in which the Fourteenth Amendment laid down the controlling
principle that no state shall deny to any person the equal protection of the
laws.
The crucial point in any analysis of the Brown v. Board of Educatioie decision is the Court's conclusion that racial segregation imposes
special harmful effects upon Negro children. The opinion stated that
separating the Negro children "from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely to be undone."3 The Court quoted from the
finding of the Kansas court that segregation by force of law "is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group" and produces
a "sense of inferiority" which "affects the motivation of a child to
learn." 4 The Court then concluded: "Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this
finding is amply supported by modern authority."' At this point the
Court dropped a footnote which referred to several sociological studies
on the relationship between racial segregation and the development of
Negro children.
This is the point in the Court's opinion which has drawn the strongest fire, aimed at establishing that the decision is not "law" but
"sociology." And this is the crucial point in the opinion, for if it is now
found that racial segregation has a special damaging effect upon Negroes,
it is clear, contrary to the assumption of earlier decisions, that separation
is not equal and that the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement of
equality has been violated. Also reduced in significance are arguments
2.
3.
4.
5.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 494.
Ibid.
Ibid.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
that the framers of the Amendment did not anticipate integrated schools,
for any such assumption would have reflected a judgment concerning
the facts to which their basic constitutional standard would apply; under
conventional legal traditions, as the facts change or become more clearly
perceived, the results required by the basic standard also must change.
The authors deal somewhat delicately with this issue by suggesting
that on other occasions underlying social facts have been important in
applying a rule of law. Indeed, the early case of Plessy v. Ferguson,' in
accepting the concept of "separate but equal" stated there was no basis
for concluding "that the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority."7 With this assumption
underlying the earlier cases, it is not surprising that the Court should
have turned to current evidence on whether or not racial segregation
is a device for social control which tends to keep one group in an inferior
position. And, although some who support the decision feel that there
was an obvious answer to this question which was only beclouded by the
sociological data, there are at least as many in the other camp who stoutly
assert that segregation has been a reasonable and benevolent way of dealing with the problem. The authors minimize the importance of the
sociological material by stressing that the Court declared as a matter of
law the per se invalidity of racial classifications. But the route to this
new rule of law is sufficiently difficult and important to justify further
probing.
The problem suffers from inherent difficulty which can easily blur
analysis. As has already been noted, the essential issue is one of factwhether segregation involves special harm for Negroes and therefore violates the constitutional standard of equality. But the basic factual issue can
not be relitigated in each case which involves the question. Rather, the
factual question seems to be merely a phase in the Court's development of
constitutional wisdom, comparable to that involved in deciding the extent
to which the constitutional ideal of a federal system permits states and
nation to tax each other, or permits state taxation of interstate commerce.
Answering such questions calls for wisdom based on information
which often is too diffuse for presentation in a trial; the most that can
be done is to call the Court's attention in the briefs to responsible studies
which have been made of the question. But there are times when some of
the evidence of social or economic questions could well be submitted
to the clash of cross-examination and rebuttal which is possible only at
the trial. The social scientists supporting the plaintiffs submitted the
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7. Id. at 551.
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results of specific experiments concerned with a specific question of fact:
the psychological effect of segregation. These cases had representative
counsel from both great camps in attendance. For this reason, it seems
appropriate to have employed the trial as a laboratory for investigation
of such data to help in the necessary education of the Court. The chief
pity is that counsel for the states did not adequately use their opportunity
for cross-examination and rebuttal, with the result that the reliability
of some of the data can remain open to conjecture.
But the relevance of the issues on which the social scientists wrote
and testified is inescapable, although it does not serve the usual narrow
function of closing the record of a particular case but instead leads to
a general constitutional ruling which will govern subsequent cases until
the basic factual assumptions can be shown to be wrong. And there must
be opportunity for such further proof. For example, representatives of
southern states, in a case in which adequate warning is given to responsible representatives of the opposite camp, should have the opportunity to marshall evidence-including testimony by social scientists-in
support of the proposition that a system of segregation does not handicap
the Negro. If such a showing were made, the current constitutional rule
that segregation violates the constitutional requirement of equality would
have to be modified.
Never before has the relationship between the Court's view of
underlying social facts and the making of constitutional rules been so
clearly dramatized. And to digress a bit farther from the material
covered by the book, it appears that partisans at both extremes of the
legal spectrum tend to leap from the inescapable fact that the Court is
working out new answers to old constitutional questions to the conclusion
that constitutional adjudication is merely the exercise of the personal
preferences of the justices. But, in spite of the peculiarity of constitutional law, it is possible to retain it as a rational part of government so
long as men of different social backgrounds (as was true of the 1954
Court) can be forced by new facts to new conclusions consistent with
basic constitutional standards. Indeed, if the settlement of constitutional
questions by judges is to retain sufficient respect to justify its retention
in the body politic, such must be both its ideal and practice.
The most useful parts of the book are perhaps the concluding chapters
on the various legislative measures which the states have developed to
avoid the effect of the Court's decision. The authors analyze the probable
effectiveness of these measures in the light of accepted legal doctrine and
the difficulties of litigation by private parties who are subject to intimida-
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tion and reprisal, and demonstrate the need for effective civil rights
legislation authorizing enforcement by the United States Attorney General. In short the authors have provided us with a valuable guidebook
for the further work which must be done in the course of the coming
years in order to move towards a solution of our most tenacious and
explosive domestic problem.
JOHN HONNOLDt

t

Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.

